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A Case History of Titanium Stre._s Corrosion
in Nitrogen Tetroxide
Robert E. Johnson, George F. KaDpelt , and Larry J. Korb
An investigation of the incompatibility of titanium in certain grades
of nitrogen tetro×ide will be discussed as a case history. The method-
ology used in its resolution will point out some of the dangers associate_
with compatibility testing. The methodology also will present some of the
difficulties associated with coordinating an investigation involving many
contractors and U. S. Govermment agencies. The techniques employed in
this investigation are described in considerable detail for the benefit
of investigators with similar problems.
Robert E. Johnson is Head, Materials Technology, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, I_lanned SoacecraCt Center, Houston, Texas;
George F. Kappelt is Chief Engineer, l,aboratories and Test Department,
Bell Aerosystems Company, Bufgalo, New York; and Larry J. Korb is
Supervisor, Metal!ics Group, North American Aviation, Inc., Downey,
California. This paper is scheduled for the 1966 National Metals
Congrezs, Chicago, Illino_s.
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One of the mo,_t d_,,:ir_,b]c rucket Drope]]ar, t s vsl,c:_:s in use at ti_c
pi'escnt time is the h._],_'_o] 1(: s._si,em invo]v]n_ ,'_fue]. xand a strum:"
oxidizer, such as nero'<cn_, 5_)_,nd n:tc'o[:,:n tetrox[E]e (._[20h).. In the\ /
]h'<,ject Apollo of the }!_tiona] Aeronautics and Sl_ace Administrc, tion
(_ASA), the aerozenc 50/[!20 h sy_;tem _s used for the !:.ain propulsion
systems, as well as the attitude control (react_(,n control) system._;.
The Project Apollo lunar modu]c descent and ascent stc_'.cs 8nd the reac-
tion control system (}_C_) depend upon this propel]_nt syste::,. The Saturn
booster and the Lunar Orbiter vehicle use this systc_n for attitude
control. The ;!ASA Gemin_ and Surveyor Progrm_.s and the Air _orce
transtage of the Titan ITI booster s'¢stem also use th_s Drc,_ellant
system. All of these systems require a highly efficient nressure vessel
for propellant storage since a nu_nber of the tan]:s are quite large, a_,d
it is essential to minimize weight.
Early Compatibility Testing
The use of the hypergolic nronellant in many ]'_ASA and Air =orce
programs required a considcrable amount of testing under varied condi-
tions to determine the compatibility of the metallic and the nomneta]lic
materials to be used in these systems. As a result of thesc tests, the
titanium alloy, Ti-6Al-10V, was chosen to contain the fuel and the
oxidizer. The material was solution treated and aged to give an ultimate
tensile strength of 160,000 psi, and a yield strength of 150,000 psi with
approximately 8_ minimum elongation (in 9-inch gage lengths).
Several investigators (1,2) had sho_m the reactivity of titani_n
alloys in strong oxidizers such as red f_ming nitric acid, l_ouid
fluorine, and liquid oxygen. The corrosion and impact sensitivity of
titanium alloys in N20 h were investigated under Air Force studies as
early as 1960 (3,h). To evaluate the use of these allo_s for the Project
Apollo, the prime contractor, North American Aviation, Inc., Dow-ney,
California (NAA), undertook an extensive series of tests on Ti-6AI-hV in
N20 h ranging from the effects of water content, time of exposure, mill
product form, welding, stress (up to 9C_ tensile yield strength),
galvanic couples, elevated temperatures (up to +lh0 ° F), surface finish,
and impact loading under varying conditions. The results of these tests,
published in September 1963 (5), indicated no serious compatibility: prob-
lem and only a slight impact sensitivity under high energy levels, as
was renorted by the earlier investigators. Therefore, the titani_n
alloy, Ti-6AI-hV, was declared compatible with H20 h and approved by NASA
for these applications. Significantly, all N20 h used in this investiza-
tion was procured and analyzed in accordance with the Military Specifica-
tion MIL-P-26539A "Propellant, Nitrogen Tetroxide." The analysis of this
propellant, as required by this specification, is shorn in Table I.
Description of Early Test Failures
In early 196h, two Apollo r._ain propulsion system titsnium alloy
tanks successfully completed 30-day exnosures to _[20h under maximum
operating stress (approxi_lately I00 ksi %tall stress). These tanhs were
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a_out 51 in. in din_etcr, :_bouL14 _'t Jn ]e.,_gth, approximately 0.055 in.
Jn wall thickness, llowevel', Jn January 1965, a sm_tl]er, RCS titanium
alloy tank fai]._d a similar 30-d_y t_'st at approxJ.,_i_,.te]y the same stress
level. Failure aral.ysiz by the subcontrae(.or, Be].] Aerosystems Co_u.ny
(Bell), and the prlm_, colI[.ructor, NAA, concluded th:,t the failure mode
was stress corrosion2 and the l)rob_b]c c_use :,-as eont_millatJon (po_;sib].y
chlorides) prior to heat treatment. Six crscks were observed in three
discrcte areas of the tanh wa]]. ']'his tank h_.d an Jnn_r Teflon b]addcr
which, theoretically, is,_lated the titanium from ±he N204. To be safe,
however, i0 additional tsnks (without bladders) were put into test at
Bell to represent a samplJn_Z of production runs to ensure that the con-
tamination problem was an isolated one, or aszociat('d w_th a particular
production period. Thirty-four hours after th( _.tanhs had reached test
temperature (105 ° F) and pressure, the first tank failure occurred. Three
other tanks burst in the next 9 hours of test. Photogr'aphs of the test
failures ma:¢ be seen in Figs. 1 and 2. When the faJ]ed tanks were
examined metallurgieali?,, thousands of stress corrosion cracks per tank
were found. These cracks varied from very shallow (0.003 in.) to cracks
extending through the 0.017-in. thick wall. Photomicrographs of these
cracks may be seen in Figs. 3 and 4. Other tanh tests subsequently
showed a strong time-to-failure dependence with the temperature, and a
definite relationship with the stress love]. The NASA and the Apollo
contractors wer_ faced with a serious material problem in a proven
application.
Initial Studies
0
At this point, the investigators decided not to alert the industry
because of the confidence in the earlier compatibility tests, and the
success of the main propulsion tank tests in 1964. Several hypothesez
of failure were postu]ated. These included: i) eonts_ination in the
test equipment, 2_ galvanic corrosion (due to the presence of stainless
steel and aluminum in the systems internal to the tanks), and 3) con-
tamination in the manufacturing process.
Test Approaches
Two approaches were undertaken to determine the cause of these tank
failures since the investigators still did not believe a general incom-
patibility existed between titanium alloys and N204. One approach was
to simulate the failure in the laboratory, and the second, to investigate
detailed testing and processing procedures. (For later reference, the
test centers involved at this point were _AA, Bell, and the NASA, Manned
Spacecraft Center.) In the f_rst approach, Bell personnel initiated a
coupon test program using standard stress corrosion U-bend s_Iples in
N20 h with no initial failures, even at stresses cons_derab!y higher than
those in the wall at tank failure. However, modification of the testing
technique soon resulted in reDroducib]e failures. At the same time, NAA
put two Apollo tanks and numerous coupons into test under identical
stress, temperature, and military-specification _'204 test conditions.
In the other approach, teems from Bell and NAA surveyed every step in the
processing of these tanks and compared these with steps used in the
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fabrication of the m_uin prol,ui_;iou tank anc_ oth_rr succ_._s._fu.] talJI: a]_p]l-
cations, such as those of the NA._;A Gemini and Sucveyor Pregram:_ and the
Air Vorce transtaL_e of the. Titan Y]]_ booztcr.
These investli_a%ionu, _Jlthou._h ¢'arefu]ly plamne4, only confused the,
issue. For example, the tanks and coupons und_r teat in Ca] [formia did
not fail, and only minor dJffecep, ces in processin_ wa_'e noted Ly the
fabrication survey. The chloride content of the air' Jn the vicinity of
the Bell test cells, due to the concentration of choreS ca] industries in
the area, was given cons£deration. Additional },e!p _as enlisted in the
effort. The material supplier, Titanium Vetals Corporation of America
(THCA), was asked to provide support; and addition_l consulting support,
from Ohio State University and Union Carbide and Carbon Company, Buffalo,
New York, was obtained.
The investigators noted that the small Apollo tanks differed from
all other tanks in that the natural oxides formed during ar[ing or stress
relieving were removed from the tanks which failed and left intact in
the tanks made for other applications. To determine the w.agnitude of
this problem to the space programs, NASA directed that tanks made for the
Gemini and Surveyor Progr_ms also be pub into test at Bell. The tanks
were tested under the Apollo test conditions which exceeded the require-
ments in the Gemini and Surveyor Programs, end the tanks failed in a
pattern consistent with the other Apollo tanks. Thus, the fact th:_t they
failed had no implication on the worthiness for which they were designed,
but the failures were significant in that they-sho_'ed the HCS tanhs were
not unique.
Another tank was put into test to evaluate the effect of eliminating
the galvanic couple. It also failed in a similar manner. At this point,
it was obvious that the test procedure was not at fault, that manufactur-
ing steps did not contribute significantly, and that galvanic corrosion
did not occur. This meant a general incompatibility existed between the
tank material and the test fluid. The technical Apollo stress-ccrrosion
problem now became a significant aerospace problem, with the coordination
and administration problems faced by NASA rapidly overshadowing the
technical evaluations.
Problems of Program Administration
Many inquiries were received by NASA concerning the incompatibility
of the titanium hardware designed for N20 h with aerozene 50 and other
fluids. In an effort to inform the community, NASA was host at a meeting
at the Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas, to describe the problem
as it was known at that time. Some 57 engineers and scientists repre-
senting 26 interested organizations responded. Some of the organizations
began limited test programs after the details of the problem were
released. NASA personnel were directed to use every available resource
to solve the problem since the dollars involved (Project Anollo hardware
in inventory was valued at approximately $45 million) and the potential
slip in schedule could Jeopardize the entire Project Apol]_o. Bell was
named the clearinghouse for all information and developed computer
storage systems for this task. The Defense I,_etals Information Center at
Battelle Memorial Institute, ColLumbus, Ohio, was invited to participate
and to publish factual data to prevent misinformation concernin_ the
nature of the progress.
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Test Logic
With the problem dcfin;tcly cstsblished as stress cocrosion of the
titanium with the N204, thL'ce appr,,acheswere established. The three
approacheswere: i) to prevent, by meansof p]_atimgsand coatings, the
titanitml alloy from comin_ in contact with the corrosion f]uid; 2) to
changethe stress, time, and temperature service environments suffi-
ciently to prevent the prob]em; and 3) to add inhibJtors or to remove
contmninants from the N2014to avoid corrosion.
Theseapproacheswere dictated by the Project Apo]]o requirement
that the titanium hardware in inventory had to be used with little or no
modification, if at all possible. This requirement was necessary because
of the cost involved, the long replacement time, and a prohibitive weight
increase which would be causedby a change in the tank material. In
addition, the changeor modification had to be absolutely reliable for a
man-rated spacecraft suchas the Apollo vehicle.
Platings and Coatings
Three systemswere evaluated in an effort to prevent contact between
the N20h and the titanium wall. Thesewere an oxide coating, an anodized
coating, and a Teflon coating.
Oxide Coating. The investi6ators noted that the small Apollo tank
differed from the other Apollo tanks in that the natural oxide formed
during aging or stress _elieving was removed from the lot of tanks which
failed in N20h, but was left intact on the previous successfully tested
main propulsion tank. Several specimens and one tank were oxidized in
air to form the tightly adhering blue oxides of titanium that usually are
seen on heat-treated parts. These oxides are formed at temperatures
from 1050 ° to 1200 ° F in air after a 1/2- to 1-hour exposure. Oxide-
coated specimens failed with n_nerous stress-corrosion cracks even though
electrical conductivity measurements indicated no break in the oxide
coating. An RCS tank that was oxidized in air also failed during the
test at approximately the same time as the tanks with bare surfaces;
therefore, the oxide approach was abandoned.
Anodized Coating. The material supplier, TMCA, made provisions for
anodizing several samples and two tanks at their Henderson, Nevada_
facility. Anodized coatings were formed in a NaN}{4}{PO 4 solution by a
procedure developed by the Process Research Division of TMCA (6). This
approach also was dropped because of the failure of the specimens and
the failure of one of the tanks after a longer, but unacceptable_ exposure
to the N204.
Teflon, Coating. Teflon is kno_m to be permeable to N204, but at a
relatively slow rate. Teflon is used as an inner container for a posi-
tive expulsion bladder in several Apollo applications an_ its inertness
to N20 h is well known. Early in the investigation, the use of Teflon was
proposed and several samples of Tef].on-coated titani[tm were tested. A
properly coated specimen did not fail in £est, but n_merous difficulties
in getting a defect-free coating left NASA with a low confidence in
this approach for a man-rated system. For example, installation of fill
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and vent ]]nes in ,.x 'I'eC]_m--.(.c_:_i,,_lLank could cau._: minute hol(,._ in the-,
coating theft were e:_s_,n%Tal]y not inspect_b]e.
For the;so rea_:o_:_, (.<,:_i,i_<-._:could not be seriouuly con_Jderc<] as the
pr.imary, or sol_,, modJf'_.nt,icm to thu tanks I:o ],re.vent the stress-
corrosion problem. P]'.u]s [,o evaluate other coat:inZ svst,ems such as alu-
minlun or stainlcsu.-ste<,l c]adding required cxter,._ve deve]opme_it and did
not appear to offer cit,},er aT. economical or ,a t:]m{:ly so]ut]on.
Modified Service Env]z.o_,,_ent
As in other system.<, the sl.r<_._:s--corrosion rate in N204 is dependcnb
upon the stress le_,e], and the temperat_Lre oC the metal and the corrosion
fluid. For a gi\,_n exposure time, s[.ress corrosion can be s.voide_ as a
significant problem by lowd,rinc stress or i.eml)crature, or both. In the
,ipI_Izc_,]on, the time un.qer stres is dictated byApollo pressure-vest.el " " .... s
the mission time, the wail stress _s dictated by the system operating
pressure, and the wall thLcknesses depend upon the existing hard_zare.
TempL_ratures can be lowered by loading the propellant cold (60 ° F) and
maintaining the temperatures by insulation, thermal control coatings,
and proper orient_t:ion of the spacecraft in flight. These measures are
somewhat drastic in terms of mission restrictions, but neverthaless are
considered possible. All of these data are based upon obtaining a
reliable relationship of failure time versus temperature at a constant
(wors t case) stress.
Hundreds of specimens were tested in autoclave test cells at Bell,
NAA, NASA Langley .Research Center, and other installations. The results,
along with scvera! pressure-vessel tests, established a rather unreliable
relationship which is shown in },'_g. 5. The steep slope of the line in
the figure makes the accurate prediction of the use temperature essential.
These data for a veh_c!e going to or from the moon, or for a vehicle on
the lunar surface, are not that accurate. NASA and the contractors
decided that this a_q_reach could be used for insurance, but not as the
primary solution to thur, rob]em.
It %'_.s stated earlier that the stress was fixed by wall thickness
and operaLin Z pressu>'e. Ho,.:cver, the effective tensile stress could be
l¢,wercd by surface t'_-e_.t_:e_:.s s.._ch as shot peening. Braski and
Heimerl (7) have bcer_ _orkinC o:: shot peening of titanium to prevent
stress corrosion in }tot chloric_es in support of the supersonic transport
procrs_. They directed "_,_ir k_owledge and supnort to the problem by
utilizing glass-bead pecn]n_ %o introduce a residual compressive stress
on t}_e interior titanium surfac:_. Personnel from Langley Research Center
supplied several glass-bead peened specimens to Bell. (See Ref 7,
pp. ]'-3, for a description of the specimens.) These specimens were the
first to give consistent, succ<ssful results. This approach was later
scaled to tank size, and one of the Bell tanks successfully passed a
30-day test at 105 ° }' at a 90-ksi vall stress. Several hundred samples
were tested in autoclaves with conp!ete success" therefore, shot peening
was considered sn acceptable means of modif>ing the Apollo hardware.
,4o,_, zed Oxidizer Composition
Concurrent with the efforts de.-_zribed, a large effort was initiated
to evaluate the trace eie_rents in the _H2,1._, The investigators felt that
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the key to the te_t anoma]ic:s, such _s the f_tilure of sometest centers
to reproduce the stress co_'rosion under identical test conditions, lay in
the trace cont_unin_mt_p_'<:i<_niin, ov in the actua] co_nposit_onof, the
N20h. The successful tsnk test in 1961_could bc exp]_inud, in part, by
the fact that the temperature mayhave been too low (60° to 80° F) to
bring about failure within 30 days. However',later RCStunk tests (at
NAA)at the controlled ]05° V also did not fail. At this point, electron
microprobe analys_s, electron microscope fractocraphy , and sophisticated
laboratory analytical techniqut_s were used to eliminate or _so]ate
various suspect elements and compounds.
The approaches taken by NAA and Bell in the analyses of the N204
were quite different, yet led to identical conclusions. Since the N204
used at Bell resulted in repeated failures, Bell investigated the
possibility of inadvertent contamination of the N204. Electron micro-
probe analyses showed some local concentrations of chlorine and iron near
the fracture surfaces. Chlorine is knowm to cause stress corrosion of
titanium, and efforts to produce chlorine-free N20 h were undertaken at
Bell. One approach was to precipitate the chlorine by addin_ an aqueous
solution of silver nitrate to the N204. Using treated N204, the titanium
did not stress corrode.
Meanwhile, at NAA, more than 300 titanium coupons were tested in
N20 h with no failures. Therefore, NAA considered they must be inadvert-
ently inhibiting the N2Q 4 and sought to produce super-pure N20 h by
repeated drying, oxygenation, and distillation. Specimens tested in
super-pure N20 h failed. A review of the literature indicated that
Rittenhouse (8) had stopped stress corrosion of titanium by the addition
of nitric oxide (NO) in the fu_ling nitric acid system in 1959.
Rocketdyne, Canoga Park, California, a division of NAA, was able to fail
specimens consistently in N204, except for the specimens tested in N204
with high (above specification) _rater content. Since water was known to
react with N204 and release NO, some insight into the cause of the stress
corrosion was obtained. Bell tests confirmed that adding aqueous silver
nitrate, aqueous HN03, or water to the N204 would inhibit the reaction.
An exchange of N204 between Bell, NASA, NAA, and Hercules Powder Company,
Wilmington, Delaware_ revealed that the NO content of NAA propellant,
though difficult to measure with existing analytical techniques at that
time, was, nevertheless, sianifieant. By cooling the oxidizer to 0 ° F,
Bell demonstrated that the NAA oxidizer was green in color whereas the
other oxidizers were yellow. The green color resulted from the mixture
of N20 h (yellow) and the dissolved inhibitor, NO, as N203 (blue). King,
Kappelt, and Fields (9) provide a more detailed description of the
chemistry involved. A retest was made of a main propuls{on tank with
uninhibited N204 to prove that previous successes with this tank were
related solely to the NO content. The tank f'ailed in 51 hours at 95 ° F.
Other investigators eonfi_ned the correlation of test data with the
NO content of the test fluid. It was found that if NO is present in the
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N20h :in measural)]e&mount._s,t;it:anJtun a]]oys will not stress corrode. The
reason early invezticationz sho_,,ed the titani_n to be compatible in N20 h
soon bccmne evident, since prior to June 196h, N204, when manufactured,
contained trace quantities of NO. In June 196h, an additiona], processing
step was added to further purify the N20 h and the trace NO was elimi-
nated. Since the military specification on N20 h does not require an
ana]ysis of NO, no clue was aw_ilable at the, start of the problem.
Several tank tests of the in],il_ited N204 \(N204 with NO present)/ .were
conducted at ].05° and 165 ° F with no failures. Autoclave tests on
coupons verified Jn large quantity that small additions of NO to the N20 h
would prevent stress corrosion of titanium. Therefore, a change to the
N20 h was acceptable for the Project Apollo modification.
Verification Test Program
NASA and the contractors had to decide which of the two solu-
tions was the most reliable for a critical manned spacecraft application.
The shot-peening process was subject to inspection difficulties.
Further, the effect of localized surface damage (scratches) to the peened
surface was unknown. The modification to the oxidizer composition was
subject to questions concerning propulsion performance changes, stabil-
ity, and analytical techniques. To answer some of these questions, an
extensive verification _,lan was developed involving several full-scale
tank tests.
Shot Peening
A process specification was written by representatives from NASA,
NAA, Bell, and Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, Bethpage,
Long Island, New York. Arrangements were made to shot peen one of the
main propulsion tanks at Langley Research Center. Photographs of the
shot-peening process are found in Figs. 6 and 7. The tank used for this
test was one that had been rejected for flight hardware because of
several deformed areas in the cylindrical area. Although this condition
was carefully examined by the investigators who felt that this deforma-
tion would not affect the test, subsequent testing in military-
specification grade N20 _ resulted in failure, as shown in Fig. 8. Exam-
ination by the tank fabricator, Allison Division of General Motors
Corporation, showed that local bending stresses around the deformation
added to the hoop stress and left a net tensile stress high enough to
cause stress corrosion in this area. No stress corrosion was found
anywhere except in the deformed area, proving the effectiveness of the
shot peening, but pointing out the absolute ne2d for a lack of residual
stress and for careful handling.
Modified Oxidizer Composition
Several hundred specimens tested in military-specification N204 with
various amounts of NO added proved that stress corrosion of the titanium
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would not occur if' the I;O content exceeds 0.25[ 'Iby w,.*_g,Lt. Due to the
inaccuracie_ and the to],:]'unc,:s in c_istinc, me thod:_ of _tnu]yz_ru_ UO in
small quantities, a mini_,_u_:LUO comtent of O.]Ic_ l-y _:i<ht, _:.*s e._:t_b]._shc:,]
for the procurement spec:if'{c_,.tion. A NASA spec_f:ic_ticm, HSC-PI"D-2A
dated Junc 1, 1966, "Propel].a.nl, Inhibited _.Titrof<_m Tc_.z'oxide (0.]_0
to 0.80 Percent Nitric Oxide)" is _resently in use to lu'ocure oxidizer
for Apollo flights (Table i).
A main propellant t/tF,]\was tested for 80 days at 90 ° ± /5° l;'under
maximum operatinq pressures _'Jth the NASA grade N20[_ ar}d no prob!e_s ,;ere
encountered. The tank wa._ f_,ivcn a proof-pressure test at the end of the
30 days to demonstrate no dcgr;tdation, prior to proceeding with the
additional 50-day exposu)'e. A significant proble:_1 xzas pointed out as a
result of this approach: the ana].ytical techniques for the Drocurcraent
specification were revie_ed and found to be int_dequate. Considerable
efforts were made to standardize the test techn[oues throuzhout the
Project Apollo contractor system, and efforts are still underway to
improve these analytical techniques by gas chromatography or nuclear
magnetic-resonance technJ ques.
Conclusions
Based upon the success of the modified oxidizer and the shot-peening
process problems, the Project Apollo will use the modified oxidizer to
prevent stress corrosion of the titanium pressure vessels. One particu-
lar aspect of the problem which NASA is pursuing is to determine why the
modification works. It is known that in the N204 system, dissolved
oxygen is 10w when NO is present and high when NO is removed. Earlier
work leads to the hypothesis that oxygen and chlorine are necescary for
stress-corrosion crackhn/_ of titanium alloys in hot salt. The s_ie
requirements may be true here also. No real understanding of the
inhibition of the corrosion mechanism is available at this time.
Another aspect of this problem pointed out that the compatibility
tests and the compatibility data are only good for the precise conditions
of the test. For example, a supposedly insignificant chan_e in the
manufacturing sequence of the N204 to improve the product voided all data
on the titanium and N204 compatibility. In the case of the Project
Apollo, a realistic component test revealed a problem that analysis, in
lieu of tests, would not have shown. The compatibility data must be
examined thoroughly to determine applicability; and for critical, man-
rated components the data should be verified as carefully as possible
using flight-environment simulation.
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Table i.- ComposLit]onof _]itrogcn Tetroxide
Percent required (by weight)
MIL-P-26539 MSC-PPD-2A
N20h, rain.
H20, max.
Cl- (as NOCl), max.
Nitric oxide (NO)
Particulate matter, max.
99.5 a98.70
.I0 .i0
•08 .o8
Not required a0.6 * 0.20
I0 mg/l i0 mg/l
aThe sun,nation of N201_ and "NO will not be less than 99.5 percent
by weight.
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Fi_. _ F[iled Aool!o. ttnl: __-°_er_s.test of _24 ho'urs in ?7204 .
!0
r\
Fig. 2. Failed A_oilo ts_nl: sfter ° test of .3"- hours in "_ _
i!
/
/
(a) Stress-corrosion cracks (X500).
(b) Stress-corrosion cracks (X750).
Fig. 3. Stress-corrosion cracks in 6AI-4V titanium after
34 hours in N204, 105 ° F, stress = 90 ksi.
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Fig. 6. Shot-peening process 2t Lsngley Research Center.
7
i16
0
4-_
.,-4
o
o
4-_
_A
-0
,.c:
r..)
c_
©
©
c_
0
I
o
c_
IF_g. 8. Failed Apollo tank, shot peened _t Langley Research
Center, and tested by the Allison Division of General Motors
Corporation st Wyle Laboratories.
7
i,
,
,
,
REFERENCES
W. K. Boyd, S_mz,lary of Present Information o,i Impact Sensitivity of
Titanium When Expose,] to Various Oxidizers, Defense Hctals Informa-
tion Center Memo 89.
J. B. Rittenhouse, N. D. Stolica, S. P. Vango, J. S. Whittick and
D. M. Mason, Corrosion and Ignition of Titanium Alloys in Fuming
Nitric Acid, Jet P_.opulsion Laboratory, Contract AF-33(616)-3066,
February 1957.
H. F. Scott, Jr. and C. W. Alle_, Impact Sensitivity of Metals
(Titanium) Exposed to L_quid Nitrogen Tetroxide, _Jright Air Develop-
ment Division, TR 61-175, May 1961.
C. W. Alley, A. W. Hayford and H. F. Scott, Jr., Nitrogen Tetroxide
Corrosion Studies, Wright Air Development Division, TR 60-38_,
July 1960.
R. L. Wallner, Nitrogen Tetroxide Compatibility With Titani_n Alloy
6Al-hV, North American Aviation, Inc., SDL 411, September 9, 1963.
6. L. C. Covington and E. E. Millaway, Anodization of Titanium in
NaNHhHPO h Solution, Titanium Metals Corporation of _erica, Henderson,
Nevada, Project h7-h2, Progress Report No. 4, September 1958.
0
7. David N. Brask_ and George J. Heimerl, The Relative Susceptibility of
Four Commercial Alloys to Salt Stress Corrosion at 550 ° F, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, TN D-2011, December 1963.
,
,
J. B. Rittenhouse, The Corrosion, Pyrophoricity, and Stress Corrosion
of Titanium Alloys in Fuming Nitric Acid, Trans. ASM, Vol 51, 1959,
pp. 871-899.
E. J. King, G. F. Kappelt and C. Fields, Titanium Stress Corrosion
Cracking in N204, Nationa] Association of Corrosion Engineers
Conference Paper, Miami Beach, Florida, April 18, 1966.
18
Johnson, et al
